The campaign to legitimize the secession of Northwest Somalia, which was
one-sidedly named as “Somaliland” by few self-interest groups belonging to
one single clan, who cleverly manipulated and disorientated some sectors of
their people, particular those with the least education in a bid to further
their ambitions of becoming “big fish in a small bond” had puzzled the minds
of Somali people and many experts and observers on Somali issues. The
illusion of this divisive force is to create a clan-based state in the 21st
century, where countries of mutual or economic interests are uniting and
world is becoming a global village. The pity reasons of wanting secession as
they allege are that:
(1) If Djibouti can stand alone as a state, why cannot
we?
(2) They disgracefully claim that they are not ethnic Somalis, but
migrants from Arabia and therefore, have to break away from Somalia. And
(3) they claim that they were marginalized by the southerns and Siyad Barre
regime tried to destroyed their town and villages. These three simple
reasons are all they have to back or justify of seceding from the union of
the Somalia.
The claim if Djibouti can stand alone why cannot we, doesn’t fully justify
secession. Their claim of been independent once and have brought the flag to
Mogadishu alone is untrue and ignores the fact that there were two major
political parties each belonging to one of the major clan alliances in the
region. The SNL drew its support from the Isaq, while USP was an alliance of
Darod clans of Dhulbahante and Warsengeli and Dir clans of Issa and
Gadabursi. The consent and unity of these two parties along with the SYL in
the south had created the union of the Somali Republic. Therefore, it was
not only the SNL of the Isaq that had created the union between the south
and north. On the other hand, the Djibouti case is different because of
time, cold war effect and superpowers interests in the Red Sea and the Horn
of Africa area. The French and its Western allies forbid Djibouti to join
with socialist Somalia, which was in the Communist block at the time.
Djiboutians themselves cannot understand why the Isaq want to secede while
they pursue to reunite with their motherland.
On the other hand, Somaliland consists of five regions of which three are
populated by non-Isaq clans. For instance, Sool is purely a Dhulbahanta
territory. The Dhulbahanta also occupy the district of Buhodle in the
neighboring Togdher and southern plains of Sanag. Sanag itself is mainly a
Warsengeli territory except the northern highlands were the Isaq sub-clans
of Habar Yonis and Habar Jelo inhabit. Both Dulbahanta and Warsengeli belong
to the Harti branch of the Darod clan family. Moreover, Sool and Sanag
currently fall under the regional administration of Punland in the
Northeast.
In the Awdal, the most western region, is occupied by the Gadabursi and Issa
both belonging to the Dir clan family. In fact, there are forces in the
Awdal who are campaigning for the break away of Awdal if Somaliland is
recognized as a clan state. The name “Awdal Republic” is already in the
circulation. The Isaq concentration is limited to Northwest and Togdher
regions. In other words, more than two third of the land area of Somaliland
is inhabited by non-Isaq clans.
The question is, where to draw the line of secession? Is it the former
British Protectorate of Somaliland as the Isaq claim? Since their intention
is to secede the whole territories under the British Protectorate, what
about the rights of non-Isaq clans whose territories fall in this region?
Was it their choice to be part of this Protectorate or the powerful Great
Britain seized their lands forcefully and united them under its flag? Do
these people have the right to say NO to the Isaq illusion of declaring the
region as one of their own?
Ethnically, Isaq belongs to the Dir clan family. Of the four main Dir
branches, Isaq belongs to Mohamed Maha Dir. Other Maha Dir sub-clans include
Biyomal, Bajimal and Quranyob. The other Dir clan families in the north are
the Gadabursi and Issa, who belong to Madaxweyne and Madobe Dir,
respectively. The Isaq is divided into three main sub-clans namely: Garhajis
(Habar Yonis, Ida Gale and Arap), Habar Awal and Habar Jelo. Garhajis who
are the largest and most powerful sub-clan are against secession. Many Habar
Jelo intellectuals I spoke with told me that majority of their peoples are
not secessionists.
Hence, the Isaq claim that they aren’t ethnic Somalis or have been
discriminated against by the south are pity fabrications and unfound
hysteria engineered to incite hatred between the peoples of the south and
north. In fact, it is in the records that the Hawiye and southern Dir
sub-clans had greatly contributed to the formation and financing of the SNM
in its very early stages. In his “The Cost of Dictatorship” book, Jama
Ghalib (an Isaq) witnesses the contributions paid by the Southern Dir clans
and Hawiye to the SNM in early 1980s. If there were no blood ties, then why
wouldn’t they pay the same contributions to the SSDF, which was Majerteen
opposition faction?
The barbaric actions of the late dictator Siyad Barre against the Isaq
people are regrettable and his living generals should hold liable to the
heinous crimes committed against the civilian populations. However, Siyad
Barre’s barbaric actions were not limited to the Isaq towns alone. He burned
villages, destroyed water wells and massacred civilians in the Mudug, Lower
Jubba, Hiran and Mogadishu. Moreover, what happened in Hargeisa and Burao
may also be blamed on the SNM commanders, whose military blunders and
miscalculations had caused the destruction of whole towns and massacre of
innocent civilians. The SNM’s ferocious kamakazi style attack on Hargeisa
and Burao gave the tyrant every excuse to hit back and hit hard. Should the
SNM take a different military strategy, what happened to Hargeisa and Burao
would have been averted. Therefore, the SNM commanders are equally liable
and should be questions of what their intentions were. Were their intentions
to overthrow Siyad Barre or give a ruthless tyrant a pretext to destroy
their towns and people?
On the other hand, the reality of the so-called Somaliland administration is
that it barely functions in Hargeisa and Berbera, the home turf of Mr.
Egal’s Habal Awal sub-clan. In fact, Sool and Sanag are part of Northeast
regional administration of Puntland. The administration is not popular in
Awdal and Togdher either.
The currency, which Egal and his Habar Awal sub-clan introduced and used to
rob the properties of the people, is not accepted outside Hargeisa and
Berbera. The Somali Schilling is still used in Togdher, Sool, Sanag and
Awdal. Moreover, the Habar Awal merchants who financed Egal’s administration
practically control all trade and main port of Berbera. Non-Habar Awal
merchants have difficulty exporting or importing anything at this major
regional port. Many merchants from Togdher, Sool and Sanag are alternatively
using the port of Bosaso, which offers them courteous services and far less
duties. The Awdal merchants use the port of Djibouti.
The secessionists in Hargeisa have been very busy of buying or bribing the
elders of the Isaq and non-Isaq sub-clan in the region to legitimize their
claim. So far, they have been very unsuccessful. As mentioned before, Sool
and Sanag joined the regional administration of Puntland. Awdal is planning
to stand alone if Somaliland is granted recognition, which will trigger a
bloody civil war. The secessionists have been also busy of destabilizing
Mogadishu and the south believing that the longer Mogadishu stays in chaos
and anarchy the better chance they have to get international recognition.
Actually, Mr. Egal had been paying millions of dollars to sum warlords in
Mogadishu to continue the chaos and tarnish the image of the country’s
capital as one dangerous one.
The international community is warned of the dangers of accepting clan-based
statehoods in this volatile region or continent. If these clan-based
secessionists are granted statehood, it will set an unprecedented step
towards the integration of the countries in the Horn and many others in
Africa, Asia and even Europe. Multiethnic countries such as Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria may be immediately affected. It may
lead to the declaration of independence by sub-clans and village states may
be reintroduced, taking the world back into Aristotle’s time.
The consequences of springing clan states in today’s dangerous world also
carry the danger of these poor clan states becoming safe havens to drug
barons, international smugglers or even terrorists. A situation like this
will be unable to be monitored or controlled as hundreds of clan based
village states sell whatever they can cheaply in order to survive.
Therefore, the international community has obligations to safeguard the
interests of all the peoples and should not allow the birth of clan-state in
Somalia or anywhere else in the world in order to prevent and unprecedented
chaos and lost of world law and order.
.
By: Dr. Ali Ismael (Barud)
Updated: Dec, 04, 2002
DISTRIBUTED VIA LAASCAANOOD.COM